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Abstract
A model for decision making that generalizes Expected Utility Max-
imization is presented. This model, Expected Qualitative Utility Maxi-
mization, encompasses the Maximin criterion. It relaxes both the Inde-
pendence and the Continuity postulates. Its main ingredient is the defini-
tion of a qualitative order on nonstandard models of the real numbers and
the consideration of nonstandard utilities. Expected Qualitative Utility
Maximization is characterized by an original weakening of von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s postulates. Subjective probabilities may be defined from
those weakened postulates, as Anscombe and Aumann did from the orig-
inal postulates. Subjective probabilities are numbers, not matrices as in
the Subjective Expected Lexicographic Utility approach. JEL no.: D81
Keywords: Utility Theory, Non-Standard Utilities, Qualitative Decision
Theory
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a deviation from the von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) postulates paradigm in decision theory. It suggests that it may, in
certain circumstances, be rational to judge alternatives according to the
issues in their main focus. If these issues are deemed as equal, the alter-
natives will continue to be judged as equal even if they are mixed with
different side-effects - side-effects which would not be judged as equal were
they to be in the main focus themselves. This contradicts the vNM In-
dependence axiom. Moreover, outcomes of issues in the main focus may
completely overshadow the outcomes of the side-issues, so alternatives of
the former may be judged as infinitely more (or infinitely less) preferable
than those of the latter. This contradicts the vNM Continuity axiom.
Suppose you have to choose between two lotteries. In the first lottery
you may win, with probability p, a week’s vacation in Hawaii. With prob-
ability 1−p you get nothing. In the second lottery you may win, with the
∗This work was partially supported by the Jean and Helene Alfassa fund for research
in Artificial Intelligence and by grant 136/94-1 of the Israel Science Foundation on “New
Perspectives on Nonmonotonic Reasoning”.
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same probability p, the same vacation in Hawaii, but, with probability
1 − p you get a consolation prize: a free copy of your favorite magazine.
Since the free copy is preferred to nothing, vNM’s independence postulate
implies that lottery two is preferred to lottery one. But couldn’t a ratio-
nal decision maker be indifferent between the two lotteries. One, often, I
think, buys a lottery ticket in a frame of mind focused on the big prize
and not on the consolation prize. This behavior is by no means general,
as attested by the fact lotteries often offer consolation prizes, but should
a decision maker indifferent between the two lotteries be considered irra-
tional in all situations? I think not.
A variation on this example considers also a third lottery, in which one
wins a trip to Paris with the same probability p as above, and nothing
with probability 1 − p. Suppose you try to compare lotteries one and
three. You ponder at length the advantages and disadvantages of the two
vacation spots, and decide you are indifferent between the trip to Hawaii
and the trip to Paris, all relevant considerations taken into account. You
conclude that you are also indifferent between the lotteries one and three.
The independence axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern implies that
lottery two is preferred to lottery three. But it has been argued that it is
quite unreasonable to expect the very slight improvement that lottery two
presents over lottery one to overcome the lengthy and delicate deliberation
that made you conclude that the trips to Hawaii and Paris are equivalent
for you.
Similar examples have been put forward to argue that the indifference
relation is not always transitive: lottery three is equivalent to lottery one
and to lottery two, but lottery two is preferred to lottery one. The system
presented in this paper endorses the transitivity of indifference, but allows
a decision maker to be indifferent between lotteries one and two.
Let us consider now a second situation. A patient has to choose be-
tween two options:
1. (option p) do nothing and die in a matter of weeks,
2. (option q) undergo surgery, the result of which, depending on some
objective probabilities, may be a long and happy life (denoted by l)
or an immediate death on the operation table (denoted by d). We
shall denote by λ the probability of the surgery being successful, i.e.,
the probability of l. The probability of death on the operation table
is, therefore, 1− λ.
In other terms, one has to compare mixtures p and λ l + (1− λ) d. Assum-
ing one prefers l to p and prefers p to d, vNM’s postulates imply what we
shall call property P: there is a unique λ ∈]0, 1[ for which one is indifferent
between p and λ l + (1− λ) d. For any µ > λ, one prefers µ l + (1− µ) d
to p, and for all µ < λ, one prefers p to µ l + (1− µ) d. If one thinks that
a long and happy life is overwhelmingly preferable to p so as to make
the distinction between p and d insignificant, i.e., that µ l + (1− µ) d is
preferable to p for any µ ∈]0, 1[, property P fails and one deviates from
vNM’s rationality postulates.
But would we really dismiss as irrational such a behavior, or such a
preference? After considering the question, in this section, I will pro-
pose a weakening of vNM’s postulates that allows for the preference of
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µ l + (1− µ) d over p for any µ ∈]0, 1[.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern’s point of view is perfectly acceptable and
I have no criticism for someone who adheres to it and decides there is
indeed some µ, very close to zero, perhaps, such that p is equivalent to
µ l + (1− µ) d. My only claim is that someone who thinks µ l + (1− µ) d
is preferable to p for any µ ∈]0, 1[ cannot be considered irrational outright.
An argument, very similar to the one just presented, for preferring
a mixture µ l + (1− µ) d to some p, for any µ ∈]0, 1[, even though p is
preferred to d, appears in Pascal’s [23]. There l denotes eternal bliss (the
reward of the believer if God exists), d denotes a life spent in error by
a believer in a God that does not exist, and p denotes a life spent by a
non-believer. This argument, known as Pascal’s wager, is very well-known
and the reader may find in a previous version of this work [22], a fuller
discussion.
Before entering a technical description, I will, in short, describe intu-
itively the reason for the failure of property P in the system presented in
this work, Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization. In the examples
above one may assume that consequence l is infinitely preferable to p and
d. This will be technically translated in giving an infinite value to the
utility of l, whereas p and d have finite utilities. For von Neumann and
Morgenstern, there are no infinite utilities. This work develops a frame-
work in which there are infinite utilities, by using nonstandard (in the
sense of A. Robinson [25]) utilities.
A number of papers [5, 28, 2] discussed, in the setting of the St. Pe-
tersburg’s paradox, the existence of unbounded utilities. In the last of
these papers, Aumann argues very convincingly that utilities should be
bounded. At first sight, one may think that infinite utilities imply un-
bounded utilities, and therefore Aumann argues also against infinite util-
ities, but this is not the case. His argument may be summarized in the
following way: if utilities were unbounded, for any λ ∈]0, 1[ there would be
a consequence (c) such that a lottery λ c+ (1− λ) d is preferred to a long
and happy life (l). But this seems very unreasonable to Aumann. His
argument is directed against unbounded utilities, but ineffective against
infinite utilities. Certainly, no consequence is infinitely preferable to l
and therefore, if there are infinite utilities, the utility of l is infinite. But
there is absolutely no problem if one assumes that the utility of l is in-
finite and maybe even maximal (nothing is preferred to l). In this case,
Aumann’s argument disappears. The fact that l is infinitely preferred to
some other consequence, d for example, or a sum of money, will influence
the preferences of a decider between lotteries involving l and consequences
such as d.
2 Background
Utility theory is discussed in the framework of [30, Chapter 3], see also [11].
Let H be a boolean algebra of subsets of X, and P a convex set of prob-
ability measures on H. Convex means here that:
∀p, q ∈ P, ∀λ ∈]0, 1[, λp+ (1− λ)q ∈ P.
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Here ]0, 1[ denotes the standard open real interval. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern have characterized the binary relations > on P that can be
defined by a linear functional u on P in the following way:
∀p, q ∈ P, p > q ⇔ u(p) > u(q). (1)
In Equation 1, the functional u is a function from P to the standard set
of real numbers R and the relation > in the right hand side is the usual
strict ordering on R.
Their characterization is equivalent to the following, due to Jensen [13]
(see [11, p. 1408]) three conditions, for all p, q, r ∈ P and all λ ∈]0, 1[ (a
weak order is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation):
A1 > on P is a weak order,
A2 p > q ⇒ λp+ (1− λ)r > λq + (1− λ)r,
A3 (p > q, q > r) ⇒ ∃α, β ∈]0, 1[, such that
αp+ (1− α)r > q > βp+ (1− β)r.
The three conditions above are not the original postulates of von Neumann
and Morgenstern, they are equivalent to them. They will be referred to,
nevertheless, in this work, as vNM’s postulates. A2 is usually denoted In-
dependence and A3 Continuity. The purpose of this work is to generalize
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s characterization to deal with qualitative
utilities. In the sequel, p ≥ q will denote q 6> p and p ∼ q will denote the
conjunction of p ≥ q and q ≥ p.
3 Qualitative utilities
Qualitative decision theory has been developed mostly in opposition to
quantitative decision theory, stressing decision methods that do not sat-
isfy vNM’s or Savage’s [26] postulates, the postulates generally accepted
for quantitative decision theory. The focus in qualitative decision theory
has always been on methods and algorithms, more than on an axiomatic
treatment ([4] is an exception).
A different approach is proposed here: qualitative and quantitative de-
cision theories can be viewed as special cases of a unified general theory of
decision that contains both. This unified theory is a generalization of the
quantitative theory. The power of the generalization lies in the consider-
ation of nonstandard models of the set of real numbers for utilities and a
definition of indifference that neglects infinitesimally small differences. In
this paper probabilities will always be standard. The case of nonstandard
probabilities and standard utilities has been treated, after the elaboration
of this paper, in [21]. Preliminary ideas already appeared in [19] and [20].
A well-established tradition in Decision Theory considers Expected
Utility Maximization as the only rational policy. Following this view, an
act f is strictly preferred to an act g iff the utility expected from f is
strictly larger than that expected for g. Since expected utilities are real
numbers, strictly larger has its usual, quantitative meaning. The main
claim of this paper is that the qualitative point of view may be subsumed
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by a slightly different definition of strictly larger. Suppose we consider
any model elementarily equivalent to the real numbers, more precisely,
any (standard or nonstandard) model of the real numbers, R (for the
standard model, we shall use R). Let x and y be elements of R. To make
matters simpler, suppose that both x and y are positive. The number x
is quantitatively larger than y iff x− y > 0. What could be a reasonable
definition of qualitatively larger? Clearly, if x is qualitatively larger than y
then it must be quantitatively larger: in a sense qualitatively larger means
definitely larger. A first idea that may be considered is to use a notion
that proved fundamental for nonstandard analysis (the monads of [25], or
see [16]): the notion of two numbers being infinitely close, and consider
that a number x is qualitatively larger than a number y iff x is larger
than y and not infinitely close to y, i.e., iff x− y is strictly larger than
some positive standard number. At first this idea looks appealing: if ǫ
is strictly positive and infinitesimally close to zero, and x is a standard,
strictly positive, real, we do not want x+ ǫ to be qualitatively larger
than x. At a second look, one realizes that the size of x− y should not
be judged absolutely, but relatively to the size of x: for example ǫ2 + ǫ
should be qualitatively larger than ǫ2. Therefore I propose the following
definition:
Definition 1 Let x and y be positive. We shall say that x is qualitatively
larger than y and write x ≻ y iff x−y
x
is strictly positive and not infinitesi-
mally close to zero: in other terms, iff there is a strictly positive standard
number r such that x−y
x
≥ r.
To the best of my knowledge, the idea of comparing nonstandard numbers
qualitatively, i.e., by ≻ and not by the usual ordering > is original. Notice
also that Definition 1 relies on the notion of a nonstandard number, and
that this notion is not first-order definable. We may therefore expect
for the qualitative order properties that are quite different than the ones
enjoyed by the usual order. The qualitative order is not a lexicographic
ordering. It will be shown in Section 7 that its properties are very different
from those of lexicographic orderings.
The definition may be extended to arbitrary numbers in the obvious
way:
1. if x ≥ 0 and 0 > y, then x ≻ y, and
2. x ≻ y iff −y ≻ −x,
but we shall limit ourselves to the consideration of positive utilities in this
paper. x  y shall denote x 6≻ y and x ∼ y shall denote that x  y and
y  x. Properties of the qualitative ordering ≻ are described and proved
in Appendix A.
Note that x  y does not imply x− c  y − c. If ǫ is positive and
infinitesimally close to zero, 1 + ǫ  1 but 1 + ǫ − (1− ǫ2) 6 ǫ2. Note also
that ≻ is not complete and that  is not antisymmetric. Notice that, if
we choose, for R, the standard model of the reals, R, then x ≻ y iff
x > y. Therefore our treatment would include the classical approach,
if we allowed also negative utilities. As said above, in this paper, we
concentrate on the case all utilities are positive. Is our framework, with
positive nonstandard utilities, a generalization of the classical theory, with
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standard positive and negative utilities? Since, in the classical setting,
utilities are defined only up to an additive constant, bounded utilities may
always be considered to be positive, by adding a positive large enough
constant. In view of Aumann’s [2] critique of unbounded utilities, we
feel that the present framework encompasses the most important part of
classical theory.
Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization is the version of Expected
Utility Maximization that obtains when, for utilities,
• the model chosen for the real numbers may be nonstandard, and
• real numbers are compared qualitatively, i.e., by ≻.
We want to characterize the binary relations > on P that can be defined
by a linear functional u : P →R+ in the following way:
∀p, q ∈ P, p > q ⇔ u(p) ≻ u(q). (2)
One could, as well, consider functionals of the type: u : P →R, but the
characterization of relations obtained in such a general way is more intri-
cate than the task proposed in this paper and is left for future work. We
shall note the main difference between the two characterizations in the
sequel. One should immediately notice that, by Lemma 3 part 9, if c > 0,
the utility function cu(p) defines the same ordering as u(p). But, contrary
to what happens both in the classical and in the lexicographic ordering
settings, if d ∈ R the function d+ u(x) does not, in general, define the
same ordering as u(p): consider Lemma 3 part 11. Such an instability un-
der an additive constant, and in particular an asymmetry between gains
and losses has been found in the behavior of decision makers in many in-
stances [10, 14, 27]. The question of whether Expected Qualitative Utility
Maximization, in the present form, or in the generalized version that al-
lows for negative utilities, is a realistic model for explaining such behavior
cannot be discussed in this paper.
4 Maximin as Expected Qualitative Util-
ity Maximization
As noticed above, Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization general-
izes Expected Utility Maximization: if one chooses the standard model
for real numbers then Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization boils
down exactly to Expected Utility Maximization, at least when utilities
are bounded. We shall show now that considering nonstandard utilities
enables us to obtain decision criteria that do not satisfy vNM’s postulates
and were so far considered as part of the realm of qualitative decision the-
ory. A version of the Maximin criterion will be presented. The Maximin
criterion has been proposed by A. Wald [31], in a different framework.
The criterion to be presented is a variation on this theme.
Notice that any bona fide Maximin criterion violates Independence,
and is therefore not obtainable by a lexicographic ordering, since all
such methods satisfy Independence. Suppose p ≻ q ≻ r. Then, under
the maximin criterion λr + (1− λ)p must be considered indifferent to
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λr + (1− λ)q since in both the worst possible outcome is the same and
obtains with the same probability, violating Independence.
Assume the set X is finite and H contains all subsets of X. Let the
elements of X be x0, . . . , xn−1. Let ǫ be a number that is positive and
infinitesimally close to zero and let our utility function u be the linear
function defined by: u(xi) = −ǫ
n−i−1, for i = 0, . . . , n− 1. Notice that,
exceptionally, we consider here negative utilities. Notice that xi < xj iff
i < j. The utility of a mixture λxi + (1− λ)xj is −λǫ
n−i−1 if xi < xj and
−ǫn−i−1 if xi ∼ xj . Suppose i < j and i
′ < j′. Then, λxi + (1− λ)xj <
µxi′ + (1− µ)xj′ holds iff xi < xi′ or xi ∼ xi′ and λ > µ. The decision
maker therefore compares different mixtures by comparing the worst pos-
sible outcomes and, if they are the same, their respective probabilities.
This is some form of Maximin criterion and does not satisfy A2 or A3,
but it has been considered a rational way of deciding by many authors,
and it is amenable to Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization.
5 Postulates
Suppose > is defined by some functional u as in Equation 2. First, one
easily sees that the relation > defined by Equation 2 is a weak order since
≻ is a weak order. Therefore A1 holds.
Let us know consider A2. We shall see that A2 does not hold. Let ǫ
be positive and infinitesimally close to zero. Let u(p) = 2× ǫ, u(q) = ǫ and
u(r) = 1. Then 0.5 × 2× ǫ+ 0.5 ∼ 0.5× ǫ+ 0.5 and 0.5p + 0.5r ∼ 0.5q + 0.5r.
Let us find a weakening of A2 that holds. Assume now that p > q, i.e.,
u(p) ≻ u(q). Let λ ∈ R, be a standard real number, 0 < λ < 1. Let us
compare λp+ (1− λ)r and λq + (1− λ)r. Since u is linear,
u(λp+ (1− λ)r) = λu(p) + (1− λ)u(r)
and
u(λq + (1− λ)r) = λu(q) + (1− λ)u(r).
By Lemma 3, parts 10 and 11, two cases must be considered. If (1− λ)u(r)/λu(p)
is finite, i.e., if u(r)/u(p) is finite, then,
λu(p) + (1− λ)u(r) ≻ λu(q) + (1− λ)u(r),
and therefore λp+ (1− λ)r > λq + (1− λ)r, which corresponds exactly
to A2 above. If, on the contrary, u(r)/u(p) is infinite, then, for any
λ′ ∈]0, 1[ (the standard unit interval),
(1− λ′)u(r) ∼ λ′u(p) + (1− λ′)u(r) ∼ λ′u(q) + (1− λ′)u(r) ≻ u(p).
To formulate our independence property, it is best to set the following
definition.
Definition 2 We shall say that p overrides q and write p≫ q iff p > q
and for any q′ such that q > q′ and for any λ ∈]0, 1[, λq + (1− λ)p ∼
λq′ + (1− λ)p.
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The intuitive meaning of p≫ q is that p is so much preferred to q that,
in any lottery in which p and q are the prizes, if one does not win p, one
does not even care to cash q, but would as well get any lesser prize q′.
Notice that, since > is asymmetric, the relation≫ is also asymmetric and
therefore irreflexive. The following lemma describes the tight relationship
between the properties p≫ q and u(p)/u(q) is infinite.
Lemma 1 If the relation > is defined by a linear functional as in Equa-
tion 2, then p≫ q iff either u(p)/u(q) is infinite, or p > q and q ≤ r for
any r ∈ P .
Proof: Let us proof the if part. If q ≤ r for any r ∈ P and p > q,
then obviously p≫ q. If u(p)/u(q) is infinite, then u(p) ≻ u(q) and, if
u(q) > u(q′),
λu(q) + (1− λ)u(p) ∼ (1− λ)u(p) ∼ λu(q′) + (1− λ)u(p).
Let us prove now the only if part. If u(q) ≻ u(q′) and
λu(q) + (1− λ)u(p) ∼ λu(q′) + (1− λ)u(p),
then λ(u(q)− u(q′))/(λu(q) + (1− λ)u(p) is infinitesimally close to zero
and therefore
u(q)
u(q)− u(q′)
+
1− λ
λ
u(p)
u(q)− u(q′)
is infinite. But u(q) ≻ u(q′) implies the first term is not infinite. Therefore
the second one is. Then u(p)/(u(q)− u(q′)) is infinite. But u(q)− u(q′) >
γu(q), for some standard positive γ, u(p)/(u(q)− u(q′)) < u(p)/γu(q) and
u(p)/u(q) is infinite. Our independence property may now be formulated
as:
A
′
2 p > q, r 6≫ p ⇒ ∀λ ∈]0, 1[ λp+ (1− λ)r > λq + (1− λ)r.
The intuitive meaning of A’2 is that any lottery is sensitive to both its
prizes, unless one of the prizes overrides the other one.
Let us study now property A3. Let us show it does not hold ei-
ther. Let ǫ be positive and infinitesimally close to zero. Let u(p) = 1,
u(q) = 2ǫ, u(r) = ǫ. We have p > q > r, but for any β ∈]0, 1[, u(q) ≤
βu(p) + (1− β)u(r).
Let us find a sound weakening of A3. Assume p > q > r. We have
u(p) ≻ u(q) ≻ u(r). Consider the values αu(p) + (1− α)u(r) for the
different values of α ∈]0, 1[. Since u(p) ≻ u(q), there is some standard
γ > 0 such that (u(p)− u(q))/u(p) > γ. We have (1− γ)u(p) > u(q). Let
α = 1− γ, α ∈]0, 1[. We have
αu(p) + (1− α)u(r) = (1− γ)u(p) + γu(r) > u(q) + γu(r) > u(q).
Take any α′ > α, α′ < 1. We have α′u(p) + (1− α′)u(r) ≻ u(q). We have
shown that α′p+ (1− α′)r > q.
Let us now consider the existence of a β ∈]0, 1[ such that q > βp+ (1− β)r.
We have u(q)/u(p) ≻ u(r)/u(p). If u(q)/u(p) is not infinitesimal, there is
some standard γ < 1 such that u(q)/u(p) ≻ γ ≻ u(r)/u(p). If β > 0 ap-
proaches zero, (γ − β)/(1− β) approaches γ from below. There is there-
fore some standard β ∈]0, 1[ such that γ ≻ (γ − β)/(1− β) ≻ u(r)/u(p).
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Therefore, we have (γ − β)u(p) ≻ (1− β)u(r), and γu(p) ≻ β)u(p) + (1− β)u(r).
But u(q) ≻ γu(p). We conclude that q > βp+ (1− β)r. If, on the
contrary, u(q)/u(p) is infinitesimal, for any β ∈]0, 1[, βu(p) ≻ u(q) and
βp+ (1− β)r > q. In this case, note that, for any β ∈]0, 1[,
βu(p) + (1− β)u(r) ∼ βu(p) ∼ βu(p) + (1− β)u(q).
We conclude that the following properties hold:
A
′
3 p > q > r ⇒ ∃α ∈]0, 1[ such that αp+ (1− α)r > q.
A
′′
3 p > q > r, p 6≫ q ⇒ ∃β ∈]0, 1[ such that q > βp+ (1− β)r.
6 Representation Result
All the technical work needed to prove our theorem may be found in Ap-
pendix B. The general structure of the proof is very similar to that of the
classical proof of the completeness of Jensen’s postulates for representa-
tion by a standard linear functional. Nevertheless, there are a few subtle
points, since one has to carefully avoid using those properties that hold
in the standard case but do not hold here. The main result of this work
may now be presented.
Theorem 1 If the set P is finitely generated, then the relation > satisfies
A1, A’2, A’3 and A”3 iff there is some nonstandard model R and some
linear functional u : P −→ R+ such that ∀p, q ∈ P , p > q iff u(p) ≻ u(q).
The proof of Theorem 1 is contained in Appendix B. One may certainly
weaken the restriction to a finitely generated P a bit, but some restriction
is needed here. The following example will show that Theorem 1 does not
hold if one removes the condition that P be finitely generated. Consider,
for example, any nonstandard model of the real numbers and let P be
the subset including all positive numbers that are neither infinite nor
infinitesimally close to zero. Let us consider the usual ordering > (not ≻)
on P . This ordering is easily seen to satisfy vNM’s postulates. Suppose
there is a nonstandard model R and a linear function u : P −→ R+ such
that ∀p, q ∈ P , p > q iff u(p) ≻ u(q). Since postulate A2 (independence)
holds, the image of u has to be contained in one single equivalence class
under ≍. All such equivalence classes are isomorphic (by multiplication).
We may therefore assume that the image of u is contained in the class
of numbers that are neither infinite nor infinitesimally close to zero. Any
member of this class is ∼-equivalent to a unique standard real. We may
therefore take u into the standard real numbers. But this is impossible
if the nonstandard model chosen has a cardinality that is larger than the
continuum. In this case, P has the same cardinality and, since u must be
one-to-one, its image has a cardinality larger than that of R.
7 Comparison with previous work
Numerous works during the fifties and the sixties considered weakenings
of vNM’s postulates, see [11] for a survey. Some of these weakenings try
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to describe the actual preferences of human deciders and reject the In-
dependence property A2. Often they also reject the requirement that
preferences be transitive, or that indifference be transitive. Others, based
on lexicographic orderings, keep the Independence postulate and reject
only the Continuity postulate A3: [12, 6, 7, 8, 9, 3, 17, 18, 24]. Nonstan-
dard analysis [25] appeared late on the scene. Few authors applied it to
decision theory: [29, 15].
This work proposes an original weakening based on nonstandard anal-
ysis. We shall describe its relation to lexicographic orderings first, and
then to other uses of nonstandard analysis in decision theory.
The motivation for this work is, in fact, opposite to the basic mo-
tivation for considering lexicographic orderings. The motivation for the
consideration of lexicographic orderings on probabilities is the consider-
ation of those perfection refinements of Nash Equilibria which required
optimization also off the equilibrium path, on zero-probability events. Re-
placing the zero probabilities by infinitesimal probabilities and requiring
optimization in the usual sense (i.e. with the usual linear ordering on
(non-standard) numbers) gives the desired result. The current paper is
trying to achieve exactly the opposite - “side issues” should not matter,
and hence the special ordering proposed.
For a more technical comparison, notice that our postulates are very
close to the original postulates of von Neumann and Morgenstern. In
particular the ordering < is modular (weak total) and the indifference
relation ∼ is transitive. But both A2 and A3 are weakened, in a closely
linked manner. Notice that lexicographic orderings define a preference
relation that satisfies A2, and that A2, A’3 and A”3 together imply A3,
since A2 says that p≫ q implies that for any w, w ≥ q. The weakening
offered by lexicographic orderings is therefore orthogonal to ours: any
lexicographic ordering that satisfies our postulates satisfies the full set of
vNM’s postulates.
To explain better the difference between lexicographic orderings and
our qualitative ordering, assume P is the real plane R2 ordered by the
lexicographic ordering:
(x, y) < (x′, y′) iff either x < x′ or x = x′ and y < y′.
For λ ∈ [0, 1], define λ(x, y) + (1− λ)(x′, y′) to be (λx+ (1− λ)x′, λy + (1− λ)y′).
Notice that (0, 0) < (1, 10) < (2, 0), but there is no λ ∈]0, 1[ such that
(1, 10) = λ(0, 0) + (1− λ)(2, 0) since λ(0, 0) + (1− λ)(2, 0) = (2(1− λ), 0).
Both lexicographic and qualitative orderings imply the failure of property
P of section 1. But notice that lexicographic ordering also implies the
failure of Lemma 10 since there exists some β ∈]0, 1[ such that:
(1, 10) > β(2, 0) + (1− β)(0, 0) = β(2, 0),
for example β = 0.4, and nevertheless there is no λ as above. Lexico-
graphic and qualitative orderings stem from different concerns and have
very different characteristics.
The previous uses of nonstandard numbers mentioned above consider
the usual ordering on those nonstandard models, not the qualitative or-
dering we consider. Most of the considerations of [29] concerning strategic
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games in which some pay-offs are infinite are valid in the present frame-
work too, and therefore very relevant for further work.
8 Subjective probability
In [1], Anscombe and Aumann showed that, in a slightly modified frame-
work in which the decider compares not lotteries but acts the outcomes
of which depend on the state of nature, an additional very natural postu-
late is sufficient to ensure the existence of subjective probabilities, in the
decider’s mind. This result is described in Section 8.1. In 8.2 and 8.3, it
is shown that the same holds, with minimal changes, for Expected Qual-
itative Utility Maximization. This result must be contradistincted with
LaValle and Fishburn’s [17], showing that, in the Lexicographic Subjective
Expected Utility framework, subjective probabilities have to be matrices
rather than numbers.
8.1 Anscombe-Aumann’s framework
Let P be a convex set of probability measures on H, as in Section 2. In [1],
Anscombe and Aumann consider a finite set S (of states) and the set F
(of acts) of mappings: S −→ P . The set F is a mixture set when, for
a, b ∈ F, λ ∈ [0, 1], one defines [λa+ (1− λ)b](s) as λa(s) + (1− λ)b(s).
If f is an element of P we shall identify it with the constant function
h ∈ F defined by h(s) = f for any s ∈ S. They consider binary relations
(>) on F that may be defined a probability measure p on S and a linear
function u : P −→ R by:
a > b⇔
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s)) >
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(b(s)).
Assuming P is finitely generated (in fact they have a slightly weaker con-
dition), they show that a relation > on F may be defined by a probability
measure p on S and a linear u in the way above iff > satisfies A1, A2, A3
(where > is defined on F) and one additional postulate. For any a, b ∈ F
A
′
4 If ∀s ∈ S, s 6= s0 ⇒ a(s) = b(s), then a > b ⇒ a(s0) > b(s0).
In the last part of A’4, a(s0) and b(s0) stand for the corresponding con-
stant functions.
8.2 Additional Postulate
We shall need an additional postulate, specific to our consideration of
nonstandard utilities. A definition will be handy. Roughly, an element t
of S is null iff the singleton {t} is Savage-null, i.e., if the value taken by
an act on t is insignificant.
Definition 3 Let t ∈ S. The element t is said to be null iff for any
a, b ∈ F we have a ∼ b if a and b agree everywhere except possibly on t,
i.e., for any s 6= t, a(s) = b(s).
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Our last postulate ensures that probabilities are standard. Assume t ∈ S,
a ∈ F and one of the possible values of a, a(t), overrides a, i.e., a(t)≫ a.
It must be the case that t is null.
A
′
5 t ∈ S, a ∈ F, a(t)≫ a ⇒ t is null.
A first consequence of A’4 shall be proved now.
Lemma 2 Assume A1 and A’4 hold. If a(s)  b(s) for any s ∈ S, then
a  b.
Proof: By induction on the number of elements s of S for which
a(s) 6= b(s), using A’4.
8.3 Characterization Theorem
A theorem similar to Anscombe and Aumann’s holds for Expected Qual-
itative Utility Maximization.
Theorem 2 Assume P is finitely generated and > is a binary relation
on F. There is a probability measure p on S, a nonstandard model R and
a linear function u : P −→ R+ such that ∀a, b ∈ F,
a > b⇔
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s)) ≻
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(b(s)) (3)
iff the relation > satisfies A1, A’2, A’3, A”3, A’4 and A’5. If the
relation > on P is not trivial, the probability measure p is unique.
The proof may be found in Appendix C. Its general structure is similar
to Anscombe and Aumann’s, but there are a number of steps that have
to be managed in a different manner.
9 Conclusion
Nonstandard models of the real numbers provide for a natural notion of
qualitative equivalence and a principle of Qualitative Utility Maximiza-
tion. This work characterizes in full the situation in which one allows non-
standard utilities but insists on standard probabilities. In this framework
one may consider consequences that are infinitely preferable to others and
criteria of the Maximin family. Subjective probabilities may be shown to
exist as in the classical framework. They are numbers, not matrices, as
in the Lexicographic Subjective Expected Utility framework. This rep-
resents probably a clear advantage for Qualitative Utility Maximization
over lexicographic methods. But both are really orthogonal extensions of
the classical Expected Utility Maximization paradigm.
The study of games with nonstandard utilities seems appealing. The
dual case of nonstandard probabilities and standard utilities and the most
general case of nonstandard probabilities and utilities are yet to be char-
acterized. They will include consideration of subjective probabilities in-
finitesimally close to zero.
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A Properties of the Qualitative Ordering
The following lemma summarizes the main properties of the relations just
defined. Let R+ be the subset of R consisting of all positive numbers
(including zero).
Lemma 3 For any x, y, z ∈ R+
1. x ≻ y ⇒ x > y,
2. x > 0⇒ x ≻ 0,
3. the relation ≻ is asymmetric: i.e., x ≻ y ⇒ y  x,
4. x ≻ y and y ≥ z imply x ≻ z,
5. x ≥ y and y ≻ z imply x ≻ z,
6. the relation ≻ is transitive,
7. the relation ≻ is negatively transitive, i.e., modular: i.e., x  y and
y  z imply x  z,
8. the relation ∼ is an equivalence relation,
9. if c > 0, then x ≻ y iff cx ≻ cy,
10. if x ≻ y, c > 0 and c/x is finite, then x+ c ≻ y + c.
11. if x ≻ y, c > 0 and c/x is infinite, then, for any standard positive
λ, µ, ν, λc ∼ µx+ λc ∼ µy + λc ≻ νx,
12. if x ≻ y, c > 0 and y − c > 0, then x− c ≻ y − c.
Proof: Parts 1 and 2 are obvious from the definition of ≻.
Part 3 follows from part 1.
For part 4, notice that x− z ≥ x− y and (x− z)/x ≥ (x− y)/x.
For part 5, note that x− z ≥ x− y and (x− z)/x ≥ (x− y)/x.
Part 6 follows from parts 1, 4 and 5.
For part 7, assume x ≻ y. We shall show that either x ≻ z or z ≻ y.
If y ≤ z or z ≤ x we conclude by parts 4 or 5. We may therefore assume
that x > z > y. Notice that
(x− y)/x = (x− z)/x+ (z − y)/x < (x− z)/x+ (z − y)/z.
Since the left hand side is not infinitesimally close to zero, at least one
of the terms in the sum in the right hand side must be larger than some
standard number and we have shown that the relation ≻ is negatively
transitive. It follows that the relation  is transitive. It is reflexive by
part 1. The relation ∼ is therefore reflexive, transitive and symmetric,
and part 8 is proved.
Part 9 is obvious.
For part 10, assume x ≻ y. We have x > y. Therefore x+ c > y + c.
Consider
(x+ c)− (y + c)
x+ c
=
x− y
x+ c
=
x− y
x
×
x
x+ c
.
If c/x is finite, so is (x+ c)/x and x/(x+ c) is not infinitesimally close to
zero. But x ≻ y implies that (x− y)/x is not infinitesimally close to zero.
We conclude that x+ c ≻ y + c.
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For part 11, assume c/x is infinite. Both µx/λc and µy/λc are in-
finitesimally close to zero. Therefore λc ∼ µx+ λc ∼ µy + λc and λc ≻
νx.
For part 12, notice that x− c > y − c and [(x− c)− (y − c)]/(x− c) >
(x− y)/x. So far, the reader may get the feeling that the qualitative order
is just like the usual one. This would be a mistaken impression. Note that
x  y does not imply x− c  y − c. If ǫ is positive and infinitesimally
close to zero, 1 + ǫ  1 but 1 + ǫ− (1− ǫ2) 6 ǫ2. Note also that ≻ is
not complete and that  is not antisymmetric. A sequence of technical
lemmas will be stated now and used in Section 8.3. Had we used the usual
order >, they would have been obvious, for ≺ they are not.
Lemma 4 Let λ ∈]0, 1[ be a standard real number. Assume a, b, c ∈ R+
such that a = λb+ (1− λ)c, a  b, a  c. Then, a ∼ b and a ∼ c.
Proof: Suppose, without loss of generality, that b < c. Then b < a < c.
Clearly b  a and a ∼ b. But c− a = λ
1−λ
(a− b). If a−b
a
is infinitesimally
close to zero, so is c−a
c
and a ∼ c.
Lemma 5 Let n > 0, λi > 0, i = 0, . . . , n− 1, standard real numbers such
that
∑n−1
i=0
λi = 1. Let a, ai, i = 0, . . . , n− 1 be elements of a nonstandard
model R+ such that a =
∑n−1
i=0
λiai and a  ai for any i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Then, for any i = 0, . . . , n− 1, a ∼ ai.
Proof: By induction on n. The case n = 1 is obvious. The case n = 2
is dealt with by Lemma 4. For the general case, consider that
a = λ0a0 + (1− λ0)
n−1∑
i=1
λi
1− λ0
ai,
and use Lemma 4 to conclude that a ∼ a0. Similarly for ai.
Lemma 6 Let n > 0, λi ≥ 0, i = 0, . . . , n− 1, standard real numbers such
that
∑n−1
i=0
λi = 1. Let a, ai, i = 0, . . . , n− 1 be elements of a nonstandard
model R+ such that a =
∑n−1
i=0
λiai and a  ai for any i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Then, for any i = 0, . . . , n− 1 such that λi > 0, a ∼ ai.
Proof: By induction on n. The case n = 1 is obvious. For the general
case, if, for some i λi = 0, use a straightforward induction argument. If,
for any i, λi > 0, use Lemma 5.
B Derivation of the completeness result
We assume that the postulates A1, A’2, A’3 and A”3 hold and derive
some consequences. In most cases, the derivation is very similar to the
classical case, but we have to do with the weaker assumptions. First,
notice that, since p≫ q implies p > q and, by A1, the relation > is asym-
metric, so is ≫. In particular, ≫ is irreflexive.
Lemma 7 Assume p > q, λ ∈]0, 1[. Then, p > λp+ (1− λ)q > q.
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Proof: Assume p > q. We know that p 6≫ p, therefore, by A’2, for
any µ ∈]0, 1[, µp+ (1− µ)p > µq + (1− µ)p. By taking, µ = 1− λ, for
any λ ∈]0, 1[, p > (1− λ)q + λp. But we know also that q 6≫ p and there-
fore we have λp+ (1− λ)q > λq + (1− λ)q. The next lemma is most
important.
Lemma 8 Assume p > q, λ, µ ∈ [0, 1], and λ > µ. Then, λp+ (1− λ)q >
µp+ (1− µ)q.
Proof: Note that µ < 1.
λp+ (1− λ)q =
λ− µ
1− µ
p+
1− λ
1− µ
[µp+ (1− µ)q]
By Lemma 7, p > µp+ (1− µ)q. Therefore µp+ (1− µ)q 6≫ p and, by
A’2,
λ− µ
1− µ
p+
1− λ
1− µ
[µp+ (1− µ)q] >
λ− µ
1− µ
[µp+ (1− µ)q] +
1− λ
1− µ
[µp+ (1− µ)q] = µp+ (1− µ)q.
Corollary 1 Let λ, µ ∈ [0, 1]. If λp+ (1− λ)q ∼ µp+ (1− µ)q, then ei-
ther λ = µ or p ∼ q.
Proof: Let λp+ (1− λ)q ∼ µp+ (1− µ)q. Assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that p > q. By lemma 8, if λ > µ, we have λp+ (1− λ)q > µp+ (1− µ)q.
We conclude that µ ≤ λ, and, similarly, λ ≤ µ.
Corollary 2 For any p, q, r ∈ P , if p > q, there is at most one λ ∈ [0, 1]
such that r ∼ λp+ (1− λ)q.
Proof: Obvious from Corollary 1.
Lemma 9 If p≫ q and q > r, then p≫ r.
Proof: Let p≫ q and q > r. Let r′ be such that r > r′. We shall
show that, for any λ ∈]0, 1[, λr + (1− λ)p ∼ λr′ + (1− λ)p. We have,
q > r, q > r′ and p≫ q. Therefore λq + (1− λ)p ∼ λr + (1− λ)p and
λq + (1− λ)p ∼ λr′ + (1− λ)p.
Lemma 10 Let p > q > r. If one assumes that there exists some β ∈]0, 1[
such that q > βp+ (1− β)r, then there exists some γ ∈]0, 1[ such that q ∼
γp+ (1− γ)r.
Proof: By A’3, there is some α ∈]0, 1[ such that αp+ (1− α)r > q.
Let γ1 be the infimum of the set {α | αp+ (1− α)r > q} and γ2 be the
supremum of the set {β | q > βp+ (1− β)r} (by assumption this set is
non-empty). By Lemma 8, γ1 ≥ γ2. Take any γ such that γ1 ≥ γ ≥ γ2.
The choice of γ1 and γ2, together with A1 imply that q ∼ λp+ (1− λ)r.
Corollary 3 Let p ≥ q ≥ r, p > r and p 6≫ r. Then, there exists a unique
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that q ∼ λp+ (1− λ)r.
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Proof: Uniqueness has been shown in Corollary 2. Let us show ex-
istence. If p ∼ q or q ∼ r, one can take λ to be equal to one or zero
respectively. We may therefore assume that p > q > r and p 6≫ r. By
Lemma 9, p 6≫ q. By A”3 the assumptions of Lemma 10 hold and the
existence of a suitable λ is ensured.
Lemma 11 If p > p′ and q > q′, then, for any λ ∈ [0, 1], λp+ (1− λ)q >
λp′ + (1− λ)q′.
Proof: The cases λ = 0 and λ = 1 are easily treated. Assume λ ∈]0, 1[.
By A’2, either,
1. for any λ ∈]0, 1[, λp+ (1− λ)q > λp′ + (1− λ)q, or
2. q ≫ p. Similarly, either
3. for any λ ∈]0, 1[, λp′ + (1− λ)q > λp′ + (1− λ)q′, or
4. p′ ≫ q.
The only non-trivial case is when both cases 2 and 4 occur. But then, we
have both q > p and p′ > q, contradicting p > p′.
Lemma 12 If p ∼ q, λ ∈ [0, 1], then p ∼ λp+ (1− λ)q.
Proof: Suppose p ∼ q > λp+ (1− λ)q. Then, by Lemma 11,
λp+ (1− λ)q > λ[λp+ (1− λ)q] + (1− λ)[λp+ (1− λ)q] = λp+ (1− λ)q,
a contradiction. Similarly λp+ (1− λ)q > p ∼ q leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 13 Let λ ∈]0, 1[. For any p, q, p 6≫ λq + (1− λ)p.
Proof: Assume p≫ λq + (1− λ)p. We have p > λq + (1− λ)p. By
Lemmas 7 and 12, p > q and λq + (1− λ)p > q. Since p≫ λq + (1− λ)p,
we know that α[λq + (1− λ)p] + (1− α)p ∼ αq + (1− α)p, for any α ∈]0, 1[.
Therefore, for any such α, αλq + (1− αλ)p ∼ αq + (1− α)p. By Corol-
lary 1, q ∼ p, a contradiction. The next lemma does not mention the rela-
tion≫, but it does not hold in the wider framework in which negative util-
ities are allowed: 1 + ǫ ∼ 1, but 0.5(1 + ǫ) + 0.5(−1) > 0.5(1) + 0.5(−1).
Its proof is more intricate than the corresponding proof in the classical
framework, or any framework in which Independence holds.
Lemma 14 Let λ ∈ [0, 1]. If p ∼ q, then λp+ (1− λ)r ∼ λq + (1− λ)r.
Proof: Assume p ∼ q. The result is obvious for λ equal to one or zero.
We may assume λ ∈]0, 1[. If r ∼ p, then, by Lemma 12, r ∼ λp+ (1− λ)r
and, since r ∼ q r ∼ λq + (1− λ)r, and the result is proved. Assume
therefore that p 6∼ r. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
λq + (1− λ)r > λp+ (1− λ)r, We shall derive a contradiction. Assume,
first, that p > r. Since p ∼ q we have, q > r and, by Lemma 7, p ∼ q >
αq + (1− α)r > r, for any α ∈]0, 1[. Since r 6≫ p, we have, by A’2, for
any α ∈]0, 1[,
λp+ (1− λ)r > λ[αq + (1− α)r] + (1− λ)r.
But
λ[αq + (1− α)r] + (1− λ)r = λαq + (1− λα)r =
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α[λq + (1− λ)r] + (1− α)r.
We see that λq + (1− λ)r > λp+ (1− λ)r > r. But
λp+ (1− λ)r > α[λq + (1− λ)r] + (1− α)r,
for any α ∈]0, 1[, in contradiction with A’3.
Let us assume now that r > p. By Lemma 7, r > αp+ (1− α)r >
p ∼ q, for any α ∈]0, 1[. By Lemma 13 r 6≫ αp+ (1− α)r, and there-
fore, by A’2, we have λ[αp+ (1− α)r] + (1− λ)r > λq + (1− λ)r, for
any α ∈]0, 1[. But we have r > λq + (1− λ)r > λp+ (1− λ)r and,
λ[αp+ (1− α)r] + (1− λ)r = λαp+ (1− λα)r = (4)
α[λp+ (1− λ)r] + (1− α)r.
We see that, for any α ∈]0, 1[, α[λp+ (1− λ)r] + (1− α)r > λq + (1− λ)r.
By A”3, r ≫ λq + (1− λ)r, contradicting Lemma 13. Our goal is now
to show that the relation ≫ is a weak order.
Lemma 15 If p≫ q and q ≥ r, then p≫ r.
Proof: If q > r, the result follows from Lemma 9. If q ∼ r, let r′ be
such that r > r′. We shall show that, for any λ ∈]0, 1[, λr + (1− λ)p ∼
λr′ + (1− λ)p. Indeed, by Lemma 14, λr + (1− λ)p ∼ λq + (1− λ)p,
and, since q > r′ and p≫ q, λr′ + (1− λ)p ∼ λq + (1− λ)p.
Lemma 16 If p ≥ q and q ≫ r, then p≫ r.
Proof: Let p ≥ q and q ≫ r. Let r′ be such that r > r′. We shall show
that, for any λ ∈]0, 1[, (1− λ)r + λp ∼ (1− λ)r′ + λp. We know that
(1− λ)r + λq ∼ (1− λ)r′ + λq. If p ∼ q, Lemma 14 yields the desired
conclusion. We may therefore assume that p > q > r. We may assume
p 6≫ r. By Lemma 3, there is some α ∈]0, 1[ such that q ∼ αp+ (1− α)r.
Therefore, by Lemma 14, (1− λ)r + λq ∼ (1− λ)r + λ[αp+ (1− α)r] =
(1− λα)r + λαp. Similarly, (1− λ)r′ + λq ∼ (1− λα)r′ + λαp. We have
r > r′ and (1− λα)r + λαp ∼ (1− λα)r′ + λαp ∼. A’2 implies p≫ r.
Lemma 17 The relation ≫ is negatively transitive.
Proof: Assume p 6≫ q and q 6≫ r. We shall show that p 6≫ r. If r ≥ p,
the result holds. We may therefore assume that p > r. If q ≥ p, q 6≫ r
implies p 6≫ r, by Lemma 16. We may therefore assume that p > q. If
r ≥ q, p 6≫ q implies p 6≫ r, by Lemma 15. We may therefore assume that
q > r. We have p > q > r.
q 6≫ r implies there exists some r′, r > r′ and some λ ∈]0, 1[, such that
λr + (1− λ)q > λr′ + (1− λ)q. By A’2, since q 6≫ r, for any α ∈]0, 1[, we
have (1− α)r + αq > (1− α)r′ + αq.
ByA”3, since p 6≫ q, there is some γ ∈]0, 1[ such that q > γp+ (1− γ)r.
By Lemma 10, there is some β ∈]0, 1[ such that q ∼ βp+ (1− β)r. By
Lemma 14,
(1− α)r + α[βp+ (1− β)r] > (1− α)r′ + α[βp + (1− β)r]
and
αβp+ (1− αβ)r > αβp+ (1− αβ)r′
and we conclude that p 6≫ r. Let p ≍ q denote that p 6≫ q and q 6≫ p.
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Corollary 4 The relation ≫ is a weak order and therefore the relation
≍ is an equivalence relation.
Proof: We notice that ≫ is asymmetric, by A1. Lemma 17 shows that
it is negatively transitive.
Lemma 18 Let A ⊆ P be an equivalence class of P under ≍. The re-
lation > on the set A satisfies A1, A2 and A3. It may therefore be
represented by a linear functional u : A −→ R, the standard set of real
numbers. If the set P is finitely generated, then, the functional u may be
taken into the positive real numbers.
Proof: Since > is a weak order on P , it is a weak order on A ⊆ P . For
any p, q ∈ A, p 6≫ q, therefore A’2 implies A2 and A’3 and A”3 imply
A3. By Theorem 4.1 of [11], the relation > on A may be represented
by a linear functional on A. This functional is uniquely defined up to
a positive affine transformation. If the set P is finitely generated, by
Lemma 8, the range of u is bounded and therefore the addition of a large
enough constant to u ensures its range contains only positive numbers.
Lemma 19 For any p, q ∈ P , λ ∈ [0, 1], one of the following two cases
obtains:
• λp+ (1− λ)q ≍ p, or
• λp+ (1− λ)q ≍ q.
Proof: If λ is equal to zero or to one, the result is obvious. As-
sume λ ∈]0, 1[. If p ∼ q, Lemma 12 implies λp+ (1− λ)q ∼ p and there-
fore λp+ (1− λ)q ≍ p. Without loss of generality, assume p > q. Then,
by Lemma 7, p > λp+ (1− λ)q and therefore λp+ (1− λ)q 6≫ p. By
Lemma 13, p 6≫ λq + (1− λ)p. The proof of Theorem 1 will now be
presented.
Theorem 1 If the set P is finitely generated, then the relation > satisfies
A1, A’2, A’3 and A”3 iff there is some nonstandard model R and some
linear functional u : P −→ R+ such that ∀p, q ∈ P , p > q iff u(p) ≻ u(q).
Proof: The if part has been proven in Section 5. Let us deal with the
only if part. By Lemma 19 any element of P is ≍-equivalent to one of the
generators. Therefore there is a finite number of ≍-equivalence classes.
Let them be ordered by ≫: A0 ≫ A1 ≫ . . . An−1. Let us choose any
non-standard model Rand any ǫ ∈ R, positive and infinitesimally close
to zero. By Lemma 18, there are linear functions: ui : Ai −→ R such
that ∀p, q ∈ Ai, p > q iff ui(p) > ui(q). We shall define, for every p ∈ P :
u(p)
def
= ǫiui(p).
We shall show that, if p > q, then u(p) ≻ u(q). Suppose p > q. If
p≫ q, u(p)/u(q) is infinite and u(p) ≻ u(q). If p 6≫ q, then p ≍ q. Sup-
pose p, q ∈ Ai. Since ui(p) and ui(q) are standard numbers such that
ui(p) > ui(q), we have ui(p) ≻ ui(q) and ǫ
iui(p) ≻ ǫ
iui(q).
We shall show now that, if u(p) ≻ u(q), then p > q. Assume u(p) ≻ u(q).
If p ≍ q, then ǫiui(p) ≻ ǫ
iui(q) and therefore ui(p) > ui(q) and p > q. If
p 6≍ q, then there are i, j, i < j such that p ∈ Ai and q ∈ Aj and therefore
p≫ q and p > q.
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C Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 Assume P is finitely generated and > is a binary relation
on F. There is a probability measure p on S, a nonstandard model R and
a linear function u : P −→ R+ such that ∀a, b ∈ F,
a > b⇔
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s)) ≻
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(b(s)) (5)
iff the relation > satisfies A1, A’2, A’3, A”3, A’4 and A’5. If the
relation > on P is not trivial, the probability measure p is unique.
Proof: Let us prove first the only if part. Assume Equation 5 holds. We
notice that F is a mixture set and that, by letting u′(a)
def
=
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s)),
we have
a > b⇔ u′(a) ≻ u′(b).
By the results of Section 5, A1, A’2, A’3, and A”3 hold.
Let us check that A’4 holds. Assume that a(s) = b(s) for any s ∈ S,
s 6= s0 and that a > b. If
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s)) ≻
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(b(s)),
then, by Lemma 3, part 12, p(s0)u(a(s0)) ≻ p(s0)u(b(s0)). By part 9,
we have u(a(s0)) ≻ u(b(s0)). But
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s0)) = u(a(s0)) and simi-
larly
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(b(s0)) = u(b(s0)). Therefore
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s0)) ≻
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(b(s0))
and a(s0) > b(s0).
Let us check now that A’5 holds. By Lemma 1, a(t)≫ a implies
that either u(a(t))/u(a) is infinite, or a(t) > a and a ≤ b for any b ∈ F.
Since u(a) ≥ p(t)u(a(t)), if u(a(t))/u(a) is infinite, p(t) must be equal
to zero and t is null. If a(t) > a and a ≤ b for any b ∈ F, then, letting
x =
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(a(s)), we have x  u(a(s)) for any s ∈ S. By Lemma 6,
x 6∼ u(a(t)) implies that p(t) = 0, and t is null.
Let us deal now with the more challenging if part. Assume A1, A’2,
A’3, A”3, A’4 and A’5 are satisfied. By Theorem 1, since A1, A’2,
A’3 and A”3 hold, there is a nonstandard model R and a linear function
u⋆ : F −→ R+ such that ∀a, b ∈ F,
a > b⇔ u⋆(a) ≻ u⋆(b). (6)
Since P is finitely generated, by Lemma 7, there are minimal (l) and
maximal (h) elements of P . Both l and h are constant functions in F.
By Lemma 2, for any a ∈ F, l  a  h. If l ∼ h, all acts are equivalent
and the Theorem is easily proved. Suppose, therefore, that h ≻ l. By
Lemma 3, parts 9 and 12,
a > b⇔
u⋆(a)− u⋆(l)
u⋆(h)
≻
u⋆(b)− u⋆(l)
u⋆(h)
.
This means we may assume, from now on, that u⋆(l) = 0 and u⋆(h) = 1.
For t ∈ S, let us define ct ∈ F by ct(t) = h and, for s 6= t, ct(s) = l. If
t is not null, by A’5, h 6≫ ct and, by A”3 and Lemma 10 there is some
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λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ct ∼ λh+ (1− λ)l; in this case we shall define p(t) = λ
and notice that u⋆(ct) ∼ p(t). If t is null we take p(t) = 0. In this case,
notice that ct ∼ l and therefore u
⋆(ct) = 0.
Clearly, for any s ∈ S, 0 ≤ p(s) ≤ 1. We claim that, for any a ∈ F,
u⋆(a) ∼
∑
s∈S
p(s) u⋆(a(s)).
Notice that we do not claim equality, only similarity, i.e., ∼, between the
left hand side and the right hand side. Let us justify our claim now. Let
a ∈ F and c =
∑
s∈S
u⋆(a(s)). If c = 0, then, for any s ∈ S, u⋆(a(s)) = 0
and a(s) ∼ l, and by Lemma 2, a ∼ l, u⋆(a) = 0, by Lemma 3, part 2 and
the result holds. If c > 0, let
b
def
=
∑
s∈S
u⋆(a(s))
c
cs.
Let us, first, compare a and b. For any t ∈ S,
b(t) =
u⋆(a(t))
c
h+ (1−
u⋆(a(t))
c
) l.
We see that, for any t ∈ S,
u⋆(b(t)) =
1
c
u⋆(a(t)). (7)
Let us assume, first, that c ≤ 1. Define the act a′ by:
a′
def
= c b+ (1− c) l.
For any s ∈ S, a′(s) = c b(s) + (1− c)l, u⋆(a′(s)) = c u⋆(b(s)) and there-
fore u⋆(a′(s)) = u⋆(a(s)). We conclude, by Lemma 2, that a′ ∼ a, and
therefore u⋆(a) ∼ u⋆(a′). But, by linearity of u⋆, u⋆(a′) = c u⋆(b). We
conclude that u⋆(a) ∼ c u⋆(b). The case c > 1 is treated similarly by defin-
ing
b′
def
= (1/c) a+ (1− 1/c) l.
But, now, by linearity of u⋆,
u⋆(b) =
1
c
∑
s∈S
u⋆(a(s)) u⋆(cs).
Therefore
u⋆(a) ∼
∑
s∈S
u⋆(a(s)) u⋆(cs).
We have seen that u⋆(cs) ∼ p(s) when p(s) > 0 and u
⋆(cs) = p(s) when
p(s) = 0. Therefore
u⋆(a) ∼
∑
s∈S
p(s) u⋆(a(s)),
as claimed. The first conclusion we draw is that:
a > b⇔
∑
s∈S
p(s) u⋆(a(s)) ≻
∑
s∈S
p(s) u⋆(b(s)).
20
Our second conclusion is that 1 = u⋆(h) ∼
∑
s∈S
p(s)u⋆(h) =
∑
s∈S
p(s).
Therefore
∑
s∈S
p(s) ∼ 1. But, for any s ∈ S, p(s) is standard. It follows
that
∑
s∈S
p(s) = 1.
For the uniqueness claim, notice that
∑
s∈S
p(s)u(ct(s)) = p(t)u(h) + (1− p(t))u(l).
By Equation 5, then, ct ∼ p(t)h+ (1− p(t))l. By Corollary 3, there is only
one such p(t).
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